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**We Are**  
**Unprepared**

Issued by  
**The National Security**  
**League**

**National Headquarters**

**31 Pine Street**  
**New York City**

## **PURPOSE**

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It is the purpose of the National Security League to lay before the country the plans of defense which have been worked out by our military advisers—the General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the Navy—and which have been approved by the successive administrations of the War and Navy Departments; and it is then our purpose to urge citizens to cooperate in insisting that Congress pay heed to these advisers and make necessary provision for the defense of the country.

Sur war etc - Preparedness  
" - U.S. - U.S. - Hist. - European etc  
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## NO NAVAL POLICY

Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1913:

Page 31.

President of General Board to Secretary of the Navy, subject—Naval Policy.

Preparedness  
"There is no naval policy except that a policy as outlined by the General Board itself in 1903. This policy, as a policy, has remained a General Board policy only, without adoption by the Government or even by the Navy Department, and without being understood by the people or Congress."

Page 32.

U.S. Army  
"The absence of any definite naval policy on our part except in the General Board, and the failure of the people, the Congress and the Executive Government to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war. This inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation."

## LACK OF SHIPS

Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1914:

From the Report of the General Board:

Page 55.

"We are deficient 10 battleships, built, building and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program."

9-5: M. Beck, U.S. Army

## **Page 58.**

**Scout Cruisers.** In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy—battleships, destroyers and submarines—the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no scouts have been provided for since 1904.

## **Page 59.**

**Aircraft.** The Board of Aeronautics in 1913 recommended the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, one fleet dirigible and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of aircraft of any kind owned by the Navy, consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work.

“In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind.

**Gunboats.** “The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under gunboats, only a very limited number of these 30 are in condition to be available for service. Some . . . . are old boats of little value, taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons or less. Of the others . . . . no gunboats have been authorized since 1902.”

## **LACK OF MEN**

## **Page 62.**

“No Nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its Navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading Nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a

material condition for war; and in addition to trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies and furnish a reserve for casualties. . . ."

To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war, including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary, with trained crews is impossible because of the absence of trained reserves.

**Page 66.**

The bureau is of the opinion that there exists at the present time a shortage of 203 line officers, required to place in full commission all vessels of the Navy serviceable for war purposes.

**Page 67.**

There is "an actual shortage of men to man all vessels serviceable for war purposes of 4,560 men."

## **ARMY CONDITIONS**

**From the Report of the Chief of Staff, 1914:**

**Page 3.**

"According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, exclusive of the Philippine Scouts, is 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 men below its authorized strength."

**Page 4.**

The mobile Army is distributed as follows:  
In the United States proper.....30,481 men.  
In our foreign possessions.....20,863 men.

"Of the enlisted men of the mobile Army in the United States, 18,954 are in the field in Texas and on the Mexican border, 1,665 are in the field in Colorado, 245 are temporarily in Montana, 300 are in Arkansas, and only 9,317 are at their home or permanent stations."

#### **Page 5.**

The "aggregate enlisted strength of the Coast Artillery Corps required to man the coast defenses in the United States is reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery to be 24,075. The actual number available is 14,633. The aggregate enlisted strength required to man the coast defenses in foreign possessions now and soon to be completed is 6,234. The actual number now in those possessions is 2,568. There is a deficiency of 9,442 enlisted men for the home coast defense and 3,666 for those in our foreign possessions."

### **NATIONAL GUARD**

#### **Page 7. Organized Militia.**

"According to the latest returns the total strength of the Organized Militia is 8,223 officers and 119,087 enlisted men." "Only 81% of the total" . . . . . "attended the annual inspections; only 73.9% attended the camps of instruction;" only 52.56% "had any practice with the rifle during the target season of 1913 and the number who qualified as second-class men or better was 33.43%."

#### **Page 8.**

In the Philippines there is a deficiency of 33% in the "manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay;" and there are only 7,000 mobile American Troops. The proposed equip-



ment of the Panama defenses and of the Canal Zone in the matter of coast defense and mobile troops is utterly insufficient; so is also a garrison of 500 men in Alaska.

It is evident that our troops, with our present strength, cannot rapidly assemble a sufficient force fully equipped for field operations to meet an expedition such as might be dispatched against our shores.

## **OUR ARMY RESERVE—16 MEN**

**From the Report of the Secretary of War,  
1914:**

All of the Army Organizations in the United States "are on what is known as a peace footing," ranging from one-half to two-thirds of the war footing.

### **Page 8.**

"We have a reserve,—that is men, who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in times of war,—consisting of sixteen men."

On June 30, 1914, the country had as a Mobile Army in the continental United States, "1,495 officers and 25,405 men.

"If all the National Guard could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond (a doubtful result) . . . we could summon a force in this country, Regular and National Guard, amounting to 8,818 officers and 148,492 men.

"This is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers and to equip, organize, train and make them ready would take at the smallest possible estimate six months."

This means that in modern warfare "a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way

to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

"We have on hand, in reserve, sufficient small arms, small arms ammunition and equipment, roughly speaking, for the 500,000 men who would have to be called into the field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery and artillery ammunition . . . ." "It is imperative that the manufacture of artillery and ammunition, therefore, should progress as rapidly as possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained."

#### **Page 9.**

The aviation corps has but started: motor transportation for the Army is in its infancy.

#### **Page 11.**

Herewith the United States could commence "the preparation of a reserve." "The present legislation" providing for a reserve "is utterly useless for its purpose, it having produced in twenty-four months only sixteen men" and there is little or no hope that it will even properly accomplish its purpose.

### **ARTILLERY**

#### **Extracts, Abstracts and Comments on the Report of the Chief of Ordnance to the Secretary of War, 1914:**

#### **Page 21.**

In addition to the shortage of horse equipment for Field Artillery troops there is a complete deficiency of horse equipment for other branches of the volunteer service.

**Page 49.**

**Manufacture of Artillery Ammunition.** "The principal output of artillery ammunition for the year was 34,929 3-inch fixed common shrapnel and 9,600 3-inch Navy common shrapnel; 10,005 unfixed common shrapnel for 4.7 inch howitzer; 2,982 unfixed common steel shell for 4.7 inch howitzer," etc.

The Russians at the Battle of Mukden alone are stated to have fixed 250,000 rounds of 3-inch ammunition.

**The Congressional Record, December 10, 1914,  
Speech of Hon. A. P. Gardner**

**Page 101.**

"We are ten battleships short of safety," "forty-nine submarines under the standard," only twelve aeroplanes or so, and of those twelve only seven can get out of their own way. Not one of them is armored. There is not an armored train.

The gist of the whole thing as explained by our officers and officials is that "We lack men for our Navy, men for our coast defense, men of our Army, we lack artillery ammunition with which to charge artillery. We lack battleships and little scouts and we have a very deficient undersea navy and practically no overhead fleet at all."

**Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, 1914:  
Page 16.**

In Continental United States "many of the existing batteries are of a type designed approximately twenty years ago and require extensive modernizing."

## OUR INSUFFICIENT NAVY

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**Statement of Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy, Before the Committee on Navy Affairs of the House of Representatives, December, 1914:**

**Mr. Roberts:** How many of the mine-laying ships should we have?

**Admiral Fiske:** We have the San Francisco.

**Mr. Roberts:** How many should we have?

**Admiral Fiske:** Germany has five, I believe.

**Mr. Roberts:** Do you think we should have five?

**Admiral Fiske:** I think so.

**Mr. Roberts:** Should we have more than that?

**Admiral Fiske:** Yes; I should think so. Our coast is very much longer than Germany's coast. I should think we should have more than that.

**Mr. Roberts:** Have we taken any measures to develop that kind of service in our fleet?

**Admiral Fiske:** Practically speaking, no. That does not mean we have done nothing; but that we have done nothing to amount to very much. I believe Germany spent \$500,000 in 1913 on mines. They are supposed to have about 20,000 mines. How close those figures are to the actual facts, I do not know. That is what I hear. I have a good many sources of information, and I am under the impression that they have 20,000 mines.

### FLEET AUXILIARIES

**Mr. Hobson:** Admiral, are there any other auxiliaries of the fleet and auxiliary defenses you would like to call the attention of the committee to?

My idea in questioning was to bring out about our mines and the use of them, particularly our inadequate provision for them.

Admiral Fiske: I think, of course, it is very well known we are behind other nations, for instance the two great naval stations in Europe, in the matter of mines and aircraft. I think that in case of an attack on our coasts by one of those powers that our inadequacy would be very keenly felt.

Mr. Hobson: Are we in a position to do any serious scouting with an enemy's first-class fleet leaving Europe, approaching our shores or our position; are we in any position to send a ship that could stay with them or follow them and give us any serious information?

Admiral Fiske: Very imperfectly. We could do it with some, of course.

### BEHIND OTHER NAVIES

Mr. Hobson: Have we any ship in the merchant marine that would be faster than their battle cruisers that could do such a thing imperfectly while running away from battle?

Admiral Fiske: You mean the United States merchant marine?

Mr. Hobson: Yes.

Admiral Fiske: I do not think so. Of course, the merchant marine is not under the Navy, and the Navy has had very little touch with it, unfortunately.

Mr. Hobson: I want to keep to the question of grand strategy. Suppose your enemy gained control of the sea, then we would be liable to attack from one end to the other of our coast line, and also subject to attack in our possessions; and our policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine, would stand or fall with the control of the sea?

Admiral Fiske: Yes; altogether.

Mr. Hobson: On the other hand, if we ourselves, in such a fleet engagement, such a master

engagement, gained control of the sea, the whole protection of our coasts and the maintenance of our policy follows as a matter of course?

Admiral Fiske: Absolutely.

Mr. Tribble: Are we not now in a better position to control the sea than we have ever been?

My question has no regard to the trouble among foreign nations now. It is just a straight question if we are not in a better position to control the seas today; if our Navy is not better than it has been; where, with the advantage of having the Panama Canal, we are not in a better position to control the seas, as far as our seas are concerned, than we have ever been?

Admiral Fiske: No.

Mr. Tribble: Why are we not?

Admiral Fiske: Because three other navies have gone ahead much more rapidly than ours.

### **READY TO FIGHT? WHEN?**

Mr. Roberts: Admiral, we have had quite a number of opinions expressed to the committee as to how long it would take us to get ready with our Navy to fight. I would like you to give us your views as to how long it would take?

Admiral Fiske: I suppose you mean in order to fight effectively?

Mr. Roberts: That is it—successfully and effectively to meet the enemy?

Admiral Fiske: And against, of course, an effective navy?

Mr. Roberts: An effective enemy.

Admiral Fiske: I would say about five years.

Mr. Roberts: Five years?

Admiral Fiske: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: I am surprised.

The Chairman: Do you mean to fight with the ones we have or the ones you think we ought to have?

Admiral Fiske: In all the talk that I am indulging in here today, I am not thinking so much of the material of the ships, my line of work being in other directions, as of the operations. My thoughts are more on the operating end of it than simply the number of ships, the number of submarines, or the number of torpedoes; and what I have in mind all the time is what I would do if we were to have war to-morrow or next month. When I think of the number of things that we would have to do in order to get the Navy into really effective shape—by which I mean having plans, plans of preparation and plans of conduct of the war, and properly drilled mine layers and mine sweepers, and the aeronautical branch—

Mr. Roberts (interposing): Right on that point, some nations already have aeronautical equipment and mine layers and mine sweepers, have they not?

Admiral Fiske: Oh, yes.

Mr. Roberts: And we have nothing in those lines?

Admiral Fiske: Practically.

Mr. Roberts: Virtually nothing in the way of aircraft and nothing in the way of mine sweepers?

Admiral Fiske: We have two tugs fitted.

Mr. Roberts: Two tugs fitted to sweep mines?

Admiral Fiske: Yes; we have two tugs.

I was going on to say that when I think of all that has to be done in preparing general plans and detail plans of war, in getting the personnel enlisted and trained for mines and mining and aeronautical and patrol work, and the personnel enlisted and trained, ready to fight our battleships that are now in reserve, and in ordinary, and figure it all out, I conclude that it will take at least five

years. At first I thought it could be accomplished in one year, but I could not get anybody to agree with me on one year; though some people thought five years too much. It is at present largely a matter of guesswork; but I doubt if in five years we could get the Navy up to a state of efficiency, for instance, such as that of one of the navies of Europe now. I doubt it very much. Whether we ever could accomplish it or not is, in fact, a debatable question. I have heard officers say it is impossible. There is a great nation of which the head is a military man, trained from youth, and his father and grandfather were military men, and his mother was the daughter of a military man, and where all the people all through the country are people of that kind—where the emperor goes out to fleet maneuvers and carries on the operations by means of his staff; where the plans are laid in the staff office years before, and changed from year to year; where the staff go out with the fleet to see how their plans are carried out and in order that they may be always kept up to date; where the whole admiralty is organized as effectively as a ship itself is. Can we equal that nation in organizing and developing and operating a navy? Many officers say we never could. While I will not go to that extreme, I will say that it would be very hard, very hard indeed.

### **LACK OF ORGANIZATION**

Mr. Roberts: Let me ask right there, Admiral, is our naval organization that would correspond to the British Admiralty as well organized as the British Admiralty?

Admiral Fiske: We have not anything like the British Admiralty.

Mr. Roberts: Have we anything that takes its place in our service or that corresponds to it in any way?



Admiral Fiske: No.

Mr. Farr: No General Staff?

Admiral Fiske: We have no machinery for handling the Navy, for instance, in the way in which the other—I may say all the other—principal navies are handled. The British, German, Austrian, French, Italian, Russian, Japanese, and, I am pretty sure, the Argentine, are handled with what amounts to a general staff. They have different terms to denote the organization in the different languages.

Mr. Roberts: Then, am I to understand that if we were plunged into war to-morrow, we would have to handle our fleet in some sort of haphazard way, different from other nations?

Admiral Fiske: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: Due to this lack of organization and forehanded preparation for war?

Admiral Fiske: Yes.

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